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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 This lawsuit, which concerns the mismanagement of a 
Pittsburgh-area nursing home and its ensuing bankruptcy, 
comes before the Court for a third time on appeal.  In the 
present appeal, the Defendants, two former Officers and 
fourteen former Directors of the nursing home, present 
several challenges to the jury’s verdict, which found them 
liable for breach of fiduciary duties and deepening 
insolvency.  The jury also imposed punitive damages against 
the two Officers and five of the Directors. 
 We will affirm the jury’s liability findings and the 
punitive damages award imposed against the Administrator 
and the Chief Financial Officer of the nursing home.  We 
will, however, vacate the jury’s award of punitive damages 
against the Defendants who served on the nursing home’s 
Board of Directors.  We conclude that the punitive damages 
award against those Defendants was not supported by 
evidence sufficient to establish that they acted with “malice, 
vindictiveness and a wholly wanton disregard of the rights of 
others.”  Smith v. Renaut, 564 A.2d 188, 193 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1989) (citations omitted).   
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I.  
 The Lemington Home for the Aged (“the Home”), 
established in 1883, “was the oldest, non-profit, unaffiliated 
nursing home in the United States dedicated to the care of 
African-America[n] seniors.”  App. 857.  As part of its 
mission statement, the Home sought to “[e]stablish, support, 
maintain and operate an institution that is able to extend 
nursing home care for persons who are infirm due to age and 
other reasons, without regard to age, sex, race, religion, and to 
do so regardless of whether such persons themselves have the 
ability to pay for such care.”  App. 858.  
 Defendant Mel Lee Causey was hired to serve as the 
Home’s Administrator and Chief Executive Officer in 
September 1997.  Defendant James Shealey became the 
Home’s Chief Financial Officer in December 2002 and 
reported to Causey.1  Defendants Arthur Baldwin, Jerome 
Bullock, Angela Ford, Joanne Andiorio, J.W. Wallace, Twyla 
Johnson, Nicole Gaines, William Thompkins, Roy Penner, 
Eugene Downing, George Calloway, B.J. Leber, and the 
Reverend Ronald Peters all served as members of the Board 
of Directors of the Home (collectively, “Director 
Defendants”), and had “direct supervisory control, authority 
and responsibility” over Causey.  App. 859.   
 The Home had been “beset with financial troubles” for 
decades, but had remained afloat with help from the City of 
Pittsburgh, Allegheny County, and donations from several 
                                              
1 When discussed collectively, Shealey and Causey 
will hereinafter be referred to as the “Officer Defendants.” 
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private foundations.   In re Lemington Home for the Aged 
(“Lemington I”), 659 F.3d 282, 285 (3d Cir. 2011).  The 
Home’s financial difficulties became particularly acute during 
the early 2000s, under the management of the Officer 
Defendants.  The Home was cited by the Pennsylvania 
Department of Health for deficiencies at a rate almost three 
times greater than the average nursing home operating in the 
state.  In 2004, Causey began working part-time in her 
capacity as Administrator, although state law required all 
nursing homes to employ full-time Administrators.  That 
year, two patients died under suspicious circumstances while 
residing at the Home, resulting in investigations by the 
Pennsylvania Department of Health.  The Home’s patient 
recordkeeping and billing were in a state of disarray. 
 On January 6, 2005, the Board convened and voted to 
close the Home.  However, its Chapter 11 petition was not 
filed until April 13 of that year.  During the intervening 
period, the patient census dropped to as low as 37 patients.  
“At a Bankruptcy status conference held on June 23, 2005, no 
one expressed any interest in funding or acquiring the Home,” 
and the Bankruptcy Court therefore approved the Home’s 
closure.  Lemington I, 659 F.3d at 289.  It was later revealed 
that the Home had “delayed filing its Monthly Operating 
Reports for May and June until September 2005,” although 
the reports “would have shown that the Home received nearly 
$1.4 million in Nursing Home Assessment Tax payments,” 
which could have increased its chances of finding a buyer.  
Id.   
 In November 2005, the Bankruptcy Court granted the 
request made by the Committee of Unsecured Creditors (“the 
Committee”) to bring this adversary proceeding against 
Causey, Shealey, and the Director Defendants claiming 
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breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the duty of loyalty, and 
deepening insolvency.  The District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims.   
 On appeal, we vacated the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment in its entirety, concluding that “our 
independent review of the record discloses genuine disputes 
of material facts on all claims.”  Id. at 285.  On remand, the 
District Court set stringent time limits for trial, which the 
Defendants contested before this Court in a request for a writ 
of mandamus.  We denied the Defendants’ request but urged 
the District Court to consider increasing the time allotted for 
trial.  In re Baldwin, 700 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 2012).   
 The District Court increased the time limits and the 
case proceeded to a six-day jury trial, which began on 
February 19, 2013.  At the close of the Committee’s case, the 
Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law, which the 
District Court granted with respect to the breach of the duty 
of loyalty claim against the Director Defendants and denied in 
all other respects.  Following the close of trial, the jury 
deliberated for three days before returning a compensatory 
damages verdict against fifteen of the seventeen Defendants, 
jointly and severally, in the amount of $2,250,000.  The jury 
awarded punitive damages in the amount of $350,000, 
individually, against five of the Director Defendants.  The 
jury also awarded punitive damages of $1 million against 
Shealey and $750,000 against Causey.   
 Following the verdict, the Defendants filed a motion 
for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, or remittitur.  
The District Court denied that motion in its entirety.  This 
appeal followed. 
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II.  
 “We exercise plenary review of an order granting or 
denying a motion for judgment as a matter of law and apply 
the same standard as the district court.”  Lightning Lube, Inc. 
v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation 
omitted).  “[A] judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be 
granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) only if, as a matter of law, 
the record is critically deficient of that minimum quantity of 
evidence from which a jury might reasonably afford relief.”  
Trabal v. Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp., 269 F.3d 243, 
249 (3d Cir. 2001) (quotation marks and citations omitted)).  
“Because the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, 
we must examine the record in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, giving her the benefit of all reasonable inferences, 
even though contrary inferences might reasonably be drawn.”  
Dudley v. S. Jersey Metal, Inc., 555 F.2d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 
1977).  
III.  
 The Defendants first argue that the Committee 
introduced insufficient evidence at trial to establish that the 
Director and Officer Defendants had breached their duty of 
care and that the Officer Defendants had additionally 
breached their duty of loyalty.  We disagree.  The Committee 
presented evidence to the jury that was sufficient to support a 
rational finding that the Defendants had breached their 
fiduciary duties by failing to exercise reasonable diligence 
and prudence in their oversight and management of the 
Home.   
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A. Officer Defendants 
 Pennsylvania law provides:  
[A]n officer shall perform his 
duties as an officer in good faith, 
in a manner he reasonably 
believes to be in the best interests 
of the corporation and with such 
care, including reasonable 
inquiry, skill and diligence, as a 
person of ordinary prudence 
would use under similar 
circumstances.  
15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5712(c).  The duty of loyalty under 
Pennsylvania law “requires that corporate officers devote 
themselves to the corporate affairs with a view to promote the 
common interests and not their own.”  Tyler v. O’Neill, 994 F. 
Supp. 603, 612 (E.D. Pa. 1998). 
 The Committee presented extensive evidence at trial of 
Causey’s mismanagement of the Home in her role as 
Administrator, clearly satisfying the “minimum quantity of 
evidence” required to sustain the jury’s verdict on appeal.  
Trabal, 269 F.3d at 249.  The jury heard testimony that it was 
Causey’s responsibility as the nursing home Administrator to:  
make[] sure that there are 
contracts in place, that the facility 
is being managed financially, that 
bills are being paid, that the 
nursing staff is adequate in its 
numbers as well as in their 
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education and training, and that 
the facility is operating  in 
compliance with both Federal and 
State regulations, which are really 
very extensive.   
App. 1077. 
 Evidence presented at trial demonstrated that Causey 
fell far short of fulfilling these responsibilities.  Throughout 
Causey’s tenure, the Home was not in compliance with 
federal and state regulations.  Causey began her role as 
Administrator in 1997.  “[T]here were significant problems 
identified by the Pennsylvania Department of Health, the 
inspectors of the nursing home from 1998 through 2004 . . . .”  
App. 1081.  The Home was cited repeatedly for failing to 
keep proper documentation of residents’ clinical records.  In 
2004, the Department of Health launched an investigation 
following the death of patient Elaine Carrington.  The review 
concluded that “Causey lacks the qualifications, the 
knowledge of the PC regulations and the ability to direct staff 
to perform personal care services as required.”  App. 1349–
50, 2283.  This evaluation, citing Causey’s inexperience and 
lack of qualifications, came after Causey had already been in 
the role of Administrator for more than six years.    
 The jury also heard testimony that, at the time of Ms. 
Carrington’s death, Causey was not working at the Home 
full-time, despite holding the title of Administrator and 
collecting her full salary.  Pennsylvania law requires all 
facilities of the Home’s size to employ a full-time 
Administrator.  But in an application for long-term disability 
benefits she filed with the state, Causey represented that she 
was working only “20 to 24 hours per week at Lemington” 
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for more than eight months in 2004.  App. 1457.  When 
confronted at trial with this portion of her benefits 
application, Causey avoided giving a precise figure for how 
many hours she worked during this period, although she 
eventually admitted, “I was working part-time.”  App. 1820.     
 We are satisfied that the jury was presented with more 
than sufficient evidence to conclude that Causey breached her 
duty of care.  Additionally, testimony regarding Causey’s 
self-interested decision to stay on as an Administrator despite 
being unable to serve full-time as required under state law 
supported the jury’s verdict that she breached her duty of 
loyalty by collecting her full salary while not in fact fulfilling 
the duties of the role for which she was being compensated.  
 The jury also heard sufficient evidence to support its 
determination that defendant Shealey breached his duties of 
care and loyalty as Chief Financial Officer.  The Committee 
presented testimony from William Terrence Brown, a nursing 
home consultant who had conducted an assessment of the 
Home on behalf of a major creditor in May 2005.  Brown 
testified that during his review, he requested records from 
Shealey, including “the latest financial statements, monthly, 
internally prepared, the annual audits[,] . . . the last year’s 
Medicare and Medicaid cost reports[,] . . . the nursing reports, 
the census data[,] . . . accounts receivable and accounts 
payable, [and] aging reports . . . .”  App. 1196.  Brown 
testified that he repeatedly asked Shealey for this information, 
but it was not provided to him.   
 Brown also testified that, towards the end of his review 
of the Home, Shealey, in an attempt to avoid Brown’s 
persistent requests for basic financial information, locked 
himself in his office.  Brown responded by “camp[ing] 
11 
 
outside” of Shealey’s office, waiting for him to leave in order 
to speak with him about the Home’s finances.  App. 1201.   
Brown testified that when he finally managed to speak with 
Shealey: 
I said, Mr. Shealey, there really 
aren’t any books; are there? And 
he said no.  
So I said, well, Mr. Shealey, you 
got to have something that you 
keep an idea of what kind of cash 
is in the bank.  So what do you 
use for that?  
And he said, well, I’ve got, you 
know, a little Excel spread sheet I 
use, only I try to keep a bank 
balance. 
Id.  When pressed by Brown as to how long he had operated 
without a general ledger that recorded the Home’s finances in 
detail, Shealey admitted that “June 30, 2004, was the last time 
they kept any books.”  Id.  Brown testified that Shealey never 
provided him with the Excel spreadsheet he allegedly used in 
lieu of a general ledger.  Despite Shealey’s failure to provide 
these documents to Brown, minutes from a Board meeting 
following Brown’s visit state that Shealey informed the Board 
that Brown had “received everything he requested.”  App. 
1870, 3088.  Brown also testified that, under Shealey, the 
Home had failed to bill for Medicare since August 2004.  
Brown calculated that this resulted in the Home failing to 
collect at least $500,000 it was due for services rendered.   
App. 1206.   
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 The Committee also introduced into evidence an email 
that Shealey sent to a representative of Mount Ararat Baptist 
Church (“Mt. Ararat”) in April 2005, before the Home had 
filed for bankruptcy.  The proposal suggested that Mt. Ararat 
purchase Lemington “to create a revitalized faith based 
retirement community” named Mount Ararat Retirement 
Community (“MARC”).  App. 6351.  The proposal indicated 
that Shealey would “assume the position of MARC President 
and Chief Executive Officer.”  App. 6360.  Director Baldwin 
testified that he believed Shealey’s involvement in this 
potential sale was inappropriate, as Shealey would receive a 
benefit if the Home was merged with Mt. Ararat.  App. 1303, 
1315.   
 The jury therefore heard sufficient evidence to find 
that Shealey fell far short of fulfilling his duty to act “with 
such care, including reasonable inquiry, skill and diligence, as 
a person of ordinary prudence would use under similar 
circumstances.”  15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5712(c).  A person 
serving as Chief Financial Officer with reasonable skill and 
diligence would not fail to maintain a general ledger for over 
nine months, refuse to meet with a consultant hired by a 
major creditor of the Home, and forgo collection of upwards 
of $500,000 due to the Home in Medicare payments.  
Shealey’s decision to stay on as CFO despite his inability to 
competently fulfill the duties with which he was charged, 
combined with his proposal that Mt. Ararat purchase the 
Home and elevate him to the position of President and CEO, 
also gave the jury a sufficient basis for concluding that 
Shealey acted in self-interest, breaching his duty of loyalty to 
the Home.  
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B. Director Defendants 
 The evidence also supported a finding that the Director 
Defendants breached their duty of care by failing to take 
action to remove Causey and Shealey once the results of their 
mismanagement became apparent.   
 Pennsylvania law provides: 
(a) Directors.--A director of a 
nonprofit corporation shall stand 
in a fiduciary relation to the 
corporation and shall perform his 
duties as a director . . . in good 
faith, in a manner he reasonably 
believes to be in the best interests 
of the corporation and with such 
care, including reasonable 
inquiry, skill and diligence, as a 
person of ordinary prudence 
would use under similar 
circumstances.  In performing his 
duties, a director shall be entitled 
to rely in good faith on 
information, opinions, reports or 
statements, including financial 
statements and other financial 
data, in each case prepared or 
presented by any of the following: 
(1) One or more officers or 
employees of the corporation 
whom the director reasonably 
believes to be reliable and 
competent in the matters 
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presented.  (2) Counsel, public 
accountants or other persons as to 
matters which the director 
reasonably believes to be within 
the professional or expert 
competence of such person . . . .   
(b) Effect of actual knowledge.—
A director shall not be considered 
to be acting in good faith if he has 
knowledge concerning the matter 
in question that would cause his 
reliance to be unwarranted. 
15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5712. 
 The jury heard testimony that the Board was 
“responsible for the oversight of the nursing home 
Administrator and for the hiring and firing” of the Home’s 
management staff.  App. 1076.  The Directors were aware 
that the Home had “three times the deficiencies” of the 
average nursing home operating in the state during Causey’s 
tenure as Administrator.  App. 1872.  The jury heard 
testimony that an independent review of the Home in 2001 
recommended that, due to the Home’s continued citations for 
health violations, Causey should be replaced with a “seasoned 
nursing home administrator.”  App. 1095.  The report further 
urged that “[t]he facility cannot improve overall patient care 
without a competent administrator on staff . . . .”  App. 2210.  
Although the Board sought and obtained a grant of $178,000 
from the Pittsburgh Foundation to fund the search for a new 
Administrator, the funds were never used to find a 
replacement for Causey, who remained at the Home despite 
15 
 
increasing evidence that her “performance as the nursing 
home administrator was poor.”  App. 1095.  
 Although the date by which the Directors became 
aware that Causey was working part-time from April through 
December 2004 was contested at trial, some evidence was 
introduced that the Board allowed Causey to continue to 
operate and collect her full salary as Administrator with the 
knowledge she was working part-time, in violation of state 
law.  Director Andiorio testified that Causey informed the 
Board that she would be working part-time and the Board did 
not intervene to replace her with a full-time Administrator.  
App. 1867.  The jury also heard testimony from Director 
Baldwin that the Board elevated Shealey into a role as a 
“CEO type figure” from December 2004 through May 2005, 
even after the Board discovered that Shealey had not been 
maintaining proper financial records for the Home in his role 
as CFO.  App. 1297. 
 This evidence supported the jury’s finding that the 
Director Defendants did not exercise reasonable prudence and 
care in continuing to employ Causey and Shealey.  The 
Director Defendants kept Causey in the role of Administrator 
and CEO for six years in the face of abnormally high 
deficiency findings.  Even after she ceased working at the 
Home full-time, in violation of state law, the Director 
Defendants allowed Causey to continue in her role as 
Administrator.  This is not a case where directors, acting in 
good-faith reliance “on information, opinions, reports or 
statements” prepared by employees or experts, made a 
business decision to continue to employ an Administrator 
whose performance was arguably less than ideal.  15 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5712(a).  The jury heard testimony that the 
Director Defendants received several independent reports 
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documenting Causey’s shortcomings and urging that she be 
replaced.  The Director Defendants therefore had actual 
knowledge of her mismanagement, yet stuck their heads in 
the sand in the face of repeated signs that residents were 
receiving care that was severely deficient.  This is enough to 
support the jury’s verdict that the Director Defendants 
breached their duty of care to the Home.  
IV.  
 The Defendants next argue that the Committee 
introduced insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict 
that the Defendants had deepened the Home’s insolvency.  
“Even when a corporation is insolvent, its corporate property 
may have value,” which can be damaged by “[t]he fraudulent 
and concealed incurrence of debt . . . .”  Official Comm. of 
Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 
349 (3d Cir. 2001).  Thus, we have predicted that 
Pennsylvania courts would recognize the tort of deepening 
insolvency, defining it as “an injury to the Debtors’ corporate 
property from the fraudulent expansion of corporate debt and 
prolongation of corporate life.”  Id. at 347.2  We are satisfied 
                                              
2 As they did in Lemington I, the Defendants urge us to 
revisit our prior decision in Lafferty, calling to our attention 
the subsequent decisions of other courts which have refused 
to recognize deepening insolvency as a tort.  As we observed 
in response to this argument in Lemington I, we continue to 
be bound to follow Lafferty unless it is overturned by our 
Circuit sitting en banc.  659 F.3d at 294 n.6.  We also 
reserved opining on the question of whether deepening 
insolvency “may not apply to, or may involve a different 
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that the Committee introduced sufficient evidence to support 
the jury’s deepening insolvency verdict.   
 The Committee presented evidence that the Director 
Defendants concealed for over three months the Board’s 
January 2005 decision to close the Home and deplete the 
patient census.  In Lemington I, we held that this evidence 
could suggest to a jury that “although the Board knew that its 
actions would cause further deterioration of the Home’s 
finances to the detriment of its creditors, by its silence, the 
Board consciously defrauded the Home’s creditors by 
implementing these policies and delaying the filing of 
bankruptcy . . . .”  659 F.3d at 295.  Trial testimony from 
Brown, the bankruptcy consultant for the major creditors, 
supported the Committee’s theory that the Board’s decision to 
deplete the patient census before it filed for bankruptcy 
resulted in a “slow death” of the Home’s ability to generate 
revenue.  App. 1214.  The Committee presented additional 
evidence that, during the bankruptcy process, the Board failed 
to disclose in its monthly operating reports that the Home had 
received a $1.4 million Nursing Home Assessment Tax 
payment in May 2005, which could have increased the 
Home’s chances of finding a buyer.  An email from the 
Board’s bankruptcy attorney to the Board summed up the 
mismanagement of the bankruptcy process, warning that “we 
have not established a sale process in a manner that is 
                                                                                                     
standard for, a non-profit corporation,” as no party had raised 
the argument.  Id.  In the present appeal, the Defendants again 
do not argue that a different standard should apply to 
deepening insolvency in the non-profit context, so we will not 
address that question.   
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customarily done in Chapter 11 cases.  Nobody has had the 
opportunity to bid and we have no meaningful financial 
records.”  App. 3208. 
 As to the Officer Defendants, the Committee presented 
evidence that Causey and Shealey’s mismanagement of the 
Home’s finances, inattention to recordkeeping and patient 
billing, and failure to conduct a proper bankruptcy process 
damaged the already insolvent Home’s value.  Shealey did 
not maintain a general ledger of the Home’s finances in his 
capacity as CFO.  As a result of the patient-documentation 
errors repeatedly identified by the Pennsylvania Department 
of Health during Causey’s tenure, the Home did not recoup 
reimbursements it was due for care provided to Medicare 
patients, resulting in an estimated loss to the Home of 
$500,000.  App. 1085–86, 1206.  During the bankruptcy 
process, Shealey refused to meet with Brown, the consultant 
hired by the Home’s major creditors, and did not make 
information about the Home’s financial condition available to 
potential buyers.  All of this conduct damaged the Home’s 
financial viability after it had already become insolvent.  
Thus, the jury’s verdict on the deepening insolvency claim 
had ample evidentiary support. 
V.  
 Finally, the seven Defendants against whom the jury 
imposed punitive damages argue that the jury was not 
presented with certain factual prerequisites necessary to 
support a punitive damages award.  First, the Defendants 
argue that there was no evidence introduced of any 
Defendant’s financial status, even though wealth is a relevant 
consideration for punitive damage awards under Pennsylvania 
law and the District Court instructed the jury that they could 
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consider the Defendants’ wealth in fixing the amount of 
punitive damages.  The Defendants also argue that the jury 
was not presented with sufficient evidence of the Defendants’ 
subjective state of mind to justify the imposition of punitive 
damages. 
 Although we conclude that wealth evidence is not a 
necessary prerequisite for an award of punitive damages 
under Pennsylvania law, we agree that the evidence presented 
to the jury did not contain the minimum quantum of proof of 
outrageous conduct necessary to support a punitive damages 
award against any of the Director Defendants.  We will 
therefore vacate the punitive damages imposed against five of 
the Director Defendants.  However, because we conclude that 
adequate state-of-mind evidence was presented to support a 
finding that Shealey and Causey acted “outrageously,” we 
will affirm the jury’s punitive damages verdict as to them.   
A. Evidence Regarding Wealth of the Defendants 
 At the close of trial, the District Court instructed the 
jury on the relevant factors they could consider in fashioning 
a punitive damages award under § 908(2) of the Second 
Restatement of Torts, which Pennsylvania has adopted.  In 
particular, the Court instructed the jurors that they could 
consider “[t]he wealth of the Defendant or Defendants insofar 
as it is relevant in fixing an amount that will punish him or 
her, and deter him or her and others from like conduct in the 
future.”  App. 63.  However, no evidence of the Defendants’ 
wealth had been introduced to the jury during the trial in any 
form, either testimonial or documentary. 
 Defendants argue that the punitive damage award 
cannot stand because the jury was not presented with any 
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evidence regarding the wealth of any Defendant and therefore 
could not evaluate what amount of punitive damages would 
serve as an appropriate deterrent.  The wealth of a defendant 
is indeed one of the three factors that “can properly [be] 
consider[ed]” by the trier of fact in assessing an award of 
punitive damages under § 908(2).  Nonetheless, that section’s 
use of the permissive “can,” rather than the compulsory 
“must,” suggests that evidence of a defendant’s wealth is not 
a necessary prerequisite to an award of punitive damages.  
The weight of Pennsylvania case law agrees that “evidence of 
a tortfeasor’s wealth is not a necessary condition precedent 
for imposition of an award of punitive damages.”  Vance v. 46 
and 2, Inc., 920 A.2d 202, 207 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) 
(collecting cases).    
 Despite § 908(2)’s permissive language, the 
Defendants urge that evidence of wealth is a necessary 
prerequisite to an award of punitive damages.  The 
Defendants point to case law which they claim suggests that 
the fact finder is required to weigh a  defendant’s wealth to 
properly calibrate an assessment of punitive damages.  In 
Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 555 A.2d 800 (Pa. 
1989), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected a 
defendant’s claim that a punitive damages award must be 
proportional to an award of compensatory damages, noting 
that such a requirement would undermine the deterrent 
purpose of such awards: 
If the purpose of punitive 
damages is to punish a tortfeasor 
for outrageous conduct and to 
deter him or others from similar 
conduct, then a requirement of 
proportionality defeats that 
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purpose.  It is for this reason that 
the wealth of the tortfeasor is 
relevant.  In making its 
determination, the jury has the 
function of weighing the conduct 
of the tortfeasor against the 
amount of damages which would 
deter such future conduct.  In 
performing this duty, the jury 
must weigh the intended harm 
against the tortfeasor’s wealth.  If 
we were to adopt the Appellee’s 
theory [of proportionality to 
compensatory damages], 
outrageous conduct, which only 
by luck results in nominal 
damages, would not be deterred 
and the sole purpose of a punitive 
damage award would be 
frustrated.  
Id. at 803 (emphasis added).3 
                                              
3 Kirkbride’s holding that a punitive damage award 
does not need to be proportional to the compensatory 
damages assessed in a given case has been subsequently 
called into question by a string of Supreme Court cases 
holding that, as a matter of due process, “courts must ensure 
that the measure of punishment is both reasonable and 
proportionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the 
general damages recovered.”  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 
v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426 (2003).  The Defendants do 
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 Although the reasoning of the Kirkbride decision 
evinced a concern with ensuring that a punitive damages 
award must be sufficiently large to deter future wanton 
conduct by a wealthy defendant, a decision from the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania has interpreted Kirkbride’s language 
as a limitation on a court’s ability to impose punitive damages 
absent any evidence of the defendant’s wealth.  In Rubin 
Quinn Moss Heaney & Patterson, P.C. v. Kennel, 832 F. 
Supp. 922, 936 (E.D. Pa. 1993), the District Court noted as a 
consideration in its decision declining to impose punitive 
damages that “the record is devoid of evidence concerning 
[the defendant’s] wealth.”  Citing Kirkbride, the District 
Court concluded that it was “required to assess the impact the 
[punitive] damages would have on the Defendant's financial 
position,” which it could not do given the state of the record.  
Id.  
 The weight of the Pennsylvania appellate case law, 
however, interprets Kirkbride differently and concludes that 
evidence of wealth is not required to assess punitive damages 
under Pennsylvania law.  In Vance, the Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania rebuffed a claim that Kirkbride “requires that 
the jury be presented with evidence of a tortfeasor’s wealth 
before they can impose punitive damages.”  920 A.2d at 206.  
                                                                                                     
not press a constitutional due process claim regarding 
punitive damages as a part of this appeal, so we will “decline 
to resolve the thorny issue presented by the apparent conflict” 
between Kirkbride and the Supreme Court’s subsequent 
pronouncements on proportionality in punitive damage 
awards.  Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 
741 (3d Cir. 1991).   
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The Superior Court noted that Kirkbride was concerned with 
the distinct question of whether “an award of punitive 
damages had to be proportional to, or bear a reasonable 
relationship to, an award of compensatory damages.”  Id.  
Although the Vance court acknowledged that “wealth of the 
tortfeasor is a relevant consideration in effectuating the 
purpose of punitive damages,” it concluded that 
“Kirkbride does not stand for the proposition that a jury 
cannot impose punitive damages without evidence of record 
pertaining to the defendant tortfeasor’s wealth.”  Id.  The 
Superior Court later reaffirmed this holding in Reading 
Radio, Inc. v. Fink, 833 A.2d 199, 215 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003), 
which held that “the polestar for the jury’s assessment of 
punitive damages is the outrageous conduct of the defendants, 
not evidence of a defendant’s wealth.”  Similarly, in Shiner v. 
Moriarty, 706 A.2d 1228, 1242 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998), the 
Superior Court “reject[ed] the suggestion that evidence of net 
worth is mandatory” to impose punitive damages.   
 In light of the aforementioned decisions and the 
permissive, rather than compulsory language of § 908(2), we 
agree with the District Court that Pennsylvania law does not 
require evidence of a defendant’s wealth before punitive 
damages may be imposed.  For whatever reason, parties may 
make the strategic decision to not introduce such evidence at 
trial, and that decision is not a basis for vacatur of a punitive 
damages award on appeal.  
B. Evidence of Outrageous Conduct by Defendants 
 “‘Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that 
is outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or his 
reckless indifference to the rights of others.’”  Feld v. 
Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 747 (Pa. 1984) (quoting Restatement 
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(Second) of Torts, § 908(2)).  “Punitive damages . . . are not 
awarded to compensate the plaintiff for her damages but 
rather to heap an additional punishment on a defendant who is 
found to have acted in a fashion which is particularly 
egregious.”  Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 883 A.2d 439, 446 
(Pa. 2005) (citation omitted).  “The state of mind of the actor 
is vital.  The act, or the failure to act, must be intentional, 
reckless or malicious.”  Feld, 485 A.2d at 748.  “[W]e must 
make a ‘careful analysis of the entire trial record’ and 
examine whether the plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence to 
support a punitive damage award.”  David by Berkeley v. 
Pueblo Supermarket of St. Thomas, 740 F.2d 230, 237 (3d 
Cir. 1984) (quoting Berroyer v. Hertz, 672 F.2d 334, 341 (3d 
Cir. 1982)).  “‘[F]or punitive damages to be awarded there 
must be acts of malice, vindictiveness and a wholly wanton 
disregard of the rights of others.’”  Tunis Bros., 952 F.2d at 
741 (quoting Smith, 564 A.2d at 193) (emphasis added).   
1. Director Defendants 
 As to the Director Defendants—Andiorio, Baldwin, 
Thompkins, Johnson, and Bullock—insufficient evidence was 
presented to support a finding that any of them possessed a 
sufficiently culpable state of mind to warrant the imposition 
of the “extreme remedy” of punitive damages, which 
Pennsylvania courts have cautioned should be awarded “in 
only the most exceptional matters.”  Phillips, 883 A.2d at 
445.  In its decision affirming the punitive damages award 
against five of the Director Defendants, the District Court 
pointed to the same conduct that it held had supported the 
compensatory damages award against all of the Director 
Defendants.  Specifically, the District Court noted the 
Board’s failure to replace Causey despite awareness of her 
poor performance as Administrator, the Board’s January 2005 
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decision to close the Home which was not disclosed until 
April, and the mismanagement of the bankruptcy process by 
the Board.  App. 42–43.  Explaining the jury’s potential 
rationale for imposing punitive damages against only five of 
the members of the Board, the District Court concluded that, 
based on its “detailed review of the exhibits,” the Director 
Defendants against whom punitive damages were awarded 
had “received more correspondence relating to the closure of 
the Home than the other Defendants against whom liability 
was imposed, but no punitive damages were assessed.”  App. 
43–44.  The amount of information individual directors knew 
is certainly relevant to establishing their liability for inaction 
and fraudulent nondisclosure.  Nevertheless, we do not think 
that, on its own, evidence of the receipt of correspondence 
provided the jury with a sufficient basis to conclude that any 
of the five Director Defendants had engaged in “a quantum of 
outrageous conduct in addition to that undergirding the . . . 
liability . . . .”  Tunis Bros., 952 F.2d at 741 (emphasis 
added).   
 Our decision in Donaldson v. Bernstein, 104 F.3d 547 
(3d Cir. 1997), in which we sustained a punitive damages 
award against a debtor’s two principals who had engaged in 
self-dealing, provides a helpful point of contrast.  Unlike the 
evidence in that case, no evidence was presented in this 
matter that the Directors against whom the jury assessed 
punitive damages acted out of self-interest.  Indeed, in a 
decision that the Committee does not appeal, the District 
Court directed a verdict in favor of all of the Directors on the 
Committee’s claim that they had breached their duty of 
loyalty to the Home.  App. 1677.  The District Court therefore 
found the record could not possibly support an inference that 
the Directors’ conduct was motivated by the intention to 
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extract a personal profit at the expense of the best interests of 
the Home.  See In re Lampe, 665 F.3d 506 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(directors’ duty of loyalty prohibits them from “directly or 
indirectly, utiliz[ing] their position to obtain any personal 
profit or advantage other than that enjoyed also by their 
fellow shareholders” (quoting Tyler, 994 F. Supp. at 612)).  
The absence of evidence of self-dealing by any of the 
Director Defendants weighs heavily against the imposition of 
the “extreme” remedy of punitive damages.   
 Moreover, the District Court acknowledged that three 
of the Director Defendants against whom punitive damages 
were imposed—Thompkins, Johnson, and Bullock—were 
mentioned only fleetingly during the course of trial testimony.  
The District Court cast the failure to call Thompkins, 
Johnson, and Bullock as witnesses, or to ask questions of 
other witnesses about their conduct, as a strategic decision 
made by both parties, similar to the decision to not present 
testimony regarding the Defendants’ financial statuses.  But 
unlike evidence of a defendant’s wealth, which “is not a 
necessary condition precedent for imposition of an award of 
punitive damages,” Vance, 920 A.2d at 207, evidence of 
“outrageous or malicious conduct” is a necessary “legal and 
factual prerequisite” for a punitive damages award.  Tunis 
Bros., 952 F.2d at 740.  Therefore, it is the plaintiff who bears 
the burden of proving that the defendants’ conduct was 
outrageous in order to obtain a punitive damages award.  A 
vacuum of evidence at trial on this topic does not affect both 
sides equally; rather, plaintiff loses, having failed to carry her 
burden. 
 In light of the lack of state-of-mind evidence presented 
by the Committee regarding the Director Defendants against 
whom the jury imposed punitive damages, we will vacate the 
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jury’s award of punitive damages against those five 
Defendants.   
2. Officer Defendants 
 We have no such concerns about the punitive damages 
assessed against the Officer Defendants.  The 
mismanagement of the Home by Causey and Shealey was the 
focus of the Committee’s proof at trial.  As detailed above, 
the Committee presented sufficient evidence at trial to sustain 
the jury’s verdict that both Officer Defendants breached their 
duty of loyalty to the Home.  In Donaldson, we held that 
evidence of self-dealing by trustees provided sufficient 
factual support for imposition of a punitive damages award.  
104 F.3d at 556–57.  Likewise, the evidence of self-dealing 
presented at trial gave the jury a sufficient factual basis to 
conclude that the Officer Defendants acted with the 
outrageous motive of pursuing self-enrichment at the expense 
of the non-profit nursing home to which they owed fiduciary 
duties.   
 In addition to the evidence of self-dealing, the Officer 
Defendants’ state of mind was illuminated by their own 
testimony at trial.  Both Causey and Shealey responded 
evasively under cross-examination to questions about their 
conduct, allowing the jury to infer that they had acted 
culpably and continued to avoid recognizing the gravity of 
their misconduct.  For instance, the Committee questioned 
Causey about the apparent conflict between her state-benefits 
application and her trial testimony regarding how much time 
she had worked during an eight month period in 2004.  
Causey first attempted to claim that she had worked “a 
minimum of 35 hours a week,” as required by state law, 
throughout this period.  App. 1819.  When reminded that she 
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had signed a state-benefits application “under penalties of 
law” claiming that she was working just 20 to 24 hours a 
week during the same period, Causey admitted, “I was 
working part-time.”  App. 1820.  Similarly, Shealey conceded 
at trial that he had refused to give Brown, the bankruptcy 
consultant for the creditors, the financial information he 
requested.  Although Shealey initially claimed this was 
because Shealey “didn’t know who [Brown] was,” he later 
acknowledged that he had continued to refuse to cooperate 
even after being informed that Brown was a financial 
consultant.  App. 1556–57.  Taken together with the other 
evidence of their malfeasance, Causey and Shealey’s 
obfuscations at trial offered further support for the conclusion 
that they had acted outrageously, supporting the jury’s 
imposition of punitive damages against them.  
VI.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the jury’s 
liability verdict as to all Defendants and the punitive damages 
award against the Officer Defendants.  We will vacate the 
award of punitive damages imposed against Defendants 
Andiorio, Baldwin, Thompkins, Johnson, and Bullock.  
